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V E R N O N M. B R I G G S , J R . "
The Strike Insurance Plan
of tlie Railroad Industry
A FAR-REACHING program designed to minimize revenue losses
during strikes became operative in the nation's railroad industry on Sep-
tember 1, 1959.^  The plan is formally known as the Service Intermption
Policy, or, more commonly, as the railroad strike insinrance plan.
Labor Relations in Railroading
The govemment has traditionally assumed a major role in
the railroads' product and labor markets. Most operation decisions and
rate-setting activities are regulated by the Interstate Gommerce Gommis-
sion and labor-management relations have been the subject of pervasive
governmental policies for decades.^
Throughout the fifties and early sixties, the industry was in a state of
economic hstlessness. In an effort to rescue itself from this predicament,
railroad management imdertook two major pohcies: consolidation of com-
peting lines and introduction of advanced technology. Both steps led to
frequent union-management conflict. Aside from recent product market
problems, the bargaining structure of the industry has long proved to be a
breeding groxmd of unrest. Over forty craft unions represent approximately
six hundred thousand railroad workers. Most of the unions are quite small
and the majority of the members are concentrated in 23 national labor
unions. Approximately 25 per cent of unionized employees are in the five
operating brotherhoods. In a mmiber of instances, several imions compete
for the same members. Multiple and rival unionism have intensified the
traditional miUtancy of the operating crafts and, in addition, have led to
* Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Texas.
1 Brief for plaintifFs, p. 5, W. P. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 211 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). The only major railroad that is not currently a member is the New York, New Haven, and
Hartford Railroad. Originally a participant, this line was forced to withdraw due to bankrupt
status.
2 See Reed G. Richardson, The Locomotive Engineer 1863-1963: A Century of Railway
Labor Relations (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Bureau of Industrial Relations, 1963),
Ghap. XV; Jacob J. Kaufman, Collective Bargaining in the Railroad Industry (New York: King's
Grown Press, 1954), Ghap. V; Edward B. Shils, "Transportation's Labor Grisis," Harvard Busi-
ness Review, XLII (May, 1964), 84-98.
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a very fragmented bargaining structure and a high degree of strike ex-
posure.
The strike is a particularly potent weapon in this industry. Virtually all
passenger service and much of the freight service carried by the railroads
cannot be postponed. If service is not provided on time, business is usually
lost to other forms of transportation or to nonstnick competitors. Opportuni-
ties to increase business prior to a strike or to recoup business lost after a
strike are severely limited.
Establishment of the Strike Insurance Program
The railroad industry has stated that the immediate cause
for the developing of the strike insurance proposal was an alleged change
ia union strike tactics. They contend that "beginning in 1950, diere was a
shift in the tactics of railroad labor away from the national strike to the
selective or 'whipsaw' strike against one or a few of the railroads."^ In most
of these strikes, unions sought settlement terms in excess of those recom-
mended by Presidential Emergency Boards.*
The interest of the industry in a mutual assistance agreement was im-
doubtedly aroused by other factors as well. The year 1959 marked the
beginning of the attempt by the railroads to institute revised work rule
plans, which were likely to increase strikes. Moreover, the industry claimed
to be in a precarious financial position; in 1959 the average rate of return
on net invested capital in the industry was only 2.72 per cent.° Many lines
were not in a position to sustain a prolonged strike and were quite vulnerable
to the whipsaw strike pattern. The railroads were also seeking a cotmter
device to the long-established strike benefit programs of the unions. Further-
more, under an interpretation given to the provisions of the Railroad Un-
3 Brief for defendant, pp. 59-62, W. P. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 211 F. Supp. 480
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
* The unions have acknowledged this fact. See Brief for Plaintiffs, p. 45, which states that
". . . the recommendations of the Emergency Board have been generally unacceptable to labor
in recent years."
8 The average figure of 2.72 per cent return on invested capital is somewhat misleading.
The financial positions of the respective lines in the industry vary widely. For example. Fortune,
August, 1959, p. 129, reported the following rates of return for the 33 largest lines in 1959:
Rate of return on Number of firms
net invested capital in category
Twice average (over 5.4%) 9
Between 2.72% and 5.4% 11
Overall average (2.72%) 0
Between 0 and 2.72% 9
Negative return 4
Interestingly, the major strikes in the industry have—^with few exceptions—been against firms
which are consistently returning less than average for the industry.
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employment Insurance Act, primary strikers who have comphed with all
of die terms of the Railway Labor Act and with the constitution and bylaws
of their imion are entitled as of the first day of the strike to receive unem-
ployment compensation for up to 130 days.®
Accordingly, in May 1959, the Association of American Railroads (AAR)
requested the Imperial Insurance Company of Nassau, Bahamas, to write
a strike insurance policy. Under the tenns of the original policy, a minimum
participation figure was established before the plan could become operative.
The requirement was that member railroads must accoxmt for at least 65
per cent of the gross operating revenues of all railroads within the United
States in the preceding year.'' The actual response to the program was such
that it was overwhelmingly accepted by practically the entire industry.* It
became effective on September 1, 1959, for an initial three-year period and
has been renewed annually since 1962.
Provisions of the Plan
The Service Interruption Pohcy is administered by a three-
man Advisory Committee. Each member is chairman of one of the three
regional bodies that comprise the organizational structure of the AAR.
The Committee must review the applications of all the railroads which seek
to join the plan and certify that the submitted valuation of fixed costs is a
reasonable estimate. In the event of a strike, the Comjnittee is required to
determine whether or not the strike is covered by the policy.
Under the terms of the policy, a railroad has an indemnifiable work
stoppage when the strike (1) is contrary to the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act, (2) is to enforce demands contrary to the recommendations of
a Presidential Emergency Board, or (3) is in resistance to the application
of recommendations of such Emergency Boards. In addition, a strike against
a member is covered if the issue involved may affect in the future raihoads
who represent more than 50 per cent of the aggregate insured railroad
indemnities and an Emergency Board has not been appointed or failed to
make a defiinite finding on the issue.®
6 Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Railroad Retirement Board, 239 F. 2d
43 (C.A.D.C. 1956). For a discussion of this issue see Hearings, Railroad Retirement and Rail-
road Unemployment Insurance Legislation, U.S. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: 1957), pp. 434, 463^65, 482-487; and
idem., 86th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: 1959), pp. 127, 130-131, 172-177.
T Service Interruption Policy, issued by the Imperial Insurance Company, Ltd., Art. X
(1959). In the revised version of 1962, the figure for renewal was lowered to 50 per cent of the
gross operating revenue of the industry in the year prior to the anniversary date of the policy.
If the participation figure is not attained, the insurance ceases on the expiration date.
8 Press Release by the Association of American Railroads, August 17, 1959. See also Wilbur
J. Brons, "Rails Strike Insurance 'Tailor made'," Joumal of Commerce, November 5, 1959, p. 10.
» Service Interruption Policy, Art. Ill (1962).
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If the Advisory Committee rules that the strike is covered, the struck
carrier is entitled to an amount equal to its total fixed costs per day (called
the daily indemnity) multiplied by the number of days that the strike con-
tinues." Application must be made separately for each day that coverage
is sought. The Committee notifies the insin-ance company to pay the pre-
scribed daily indemnity to the struck railroad. Payment must be made
within 21 days of receipt of the approval notice.
Each participating railroad assumes an obligation for three types of
premiums when it subscribes to the insurance plan. The first is known as
the "minimvmi premium" and is payable annually. Totalling $150,000 a
year, it covers administrative expenses. The amotmt paid by each participant
is based on the ratio that its daily indenmity figure bears to the total daily
indemnities of all the participating lines.
The second premium is a single payment made when a partictilar railroad
enters into the agreement. This premium may be called an "escrow premium"
and is equal to one day's indemnity of the subscribing raikoad. It provides
an emergency fund for the insurance company to use in the event that
benefits are due a struck line and the third type of premium has not yet
been received from a nonstruck participant. In such an event, the assessed
amoimt is deducted from the escrow accotmt of the delinquent member.
The third premiimi—called the "additional premium"—is by far the most
significant. After the Advisory Committee determines that a struck railroad
is entitled to benefits, the insurance company obtains the funds to pay the
benefits by billing the nonstruck members. The amount that each railroad
is charged is equal to its prorated share of the daily indemnity due the
struck railroad. If, for example, a company's ovra daily indemnity is one
hundredth of the total indemnities of all participants, it would be required
to pay one htmdredth of the daily indemnity of the struck line.
The "additional premium" that any one railroad must pay in a given year
is subject to one of two limitations, whichever occurs earlier. The first is
that the maximimi nimiber of days that benefits may be received by a struck
carrier in any single work stoppage—or paid by the other policy holders-
is 365 days. The second is that the maximum annual liability of any single
participant for "minimimi" and "additional premiums" is set at 20 times its
own daily indenmity.
The occurrence of either of two situations renders the insurance plan void
in a particular dispute. First, should the government seize a struck line, no
benefits are due. Second, if several railroads whose combined daily indem-
i** The exact items which are classified as "fixed costs" are specified in the Application for
Service Interruption PoUcy, sec. 3.
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nities exceed 50 per cent of the total daily indemnities of all participating
lines are struck, no benefits are paid. The theory behind the latter situation
is that if such a large nvimber of railroads shut down, federal intervention
seems certain. ^ ^
The Program in the Courts
When the program became public, the operating brother-
hoods collectively denoimced its objectives.^ ^ Shortly afterward—in July
1960—the first major dispute in which strike insurance was involved occtirred
when the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (BRT) struck the insured
Long Island RaU Road. Subsequently, the BRT instituted legal proceedings
over the specific legality of the program.
Union lawyers based their case on the contention that the plan violated
three statutes: the Railway Labor Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, and
the Sherman Act. Under the Railway Labor Act, it was argued that the
strike insurance plan was a per se violation of the duty of the employer to
bargain in good faith and that it introduced an element of multi-employer
bargaining without the consent of the plaintiffs. Under the Interstate Com-
merce Act, it was contended that the escrow account constituted an illegal
pooling of the revenues of competing carriers. It was asserted that under the
Sherman Act the plan represented a unilateral attempt by the railroads to
fix the price of labor and therefore constituted an illegal restraint of trade."
The railroads contended that the insurance plan was legal." With respect
to the Railway Labor Act, the railroads claimed that the purposes of the Act
were furthered by the strike insurance program. By specific denial of bene-
fits to companies that refuse to accept recommendations tendered by Emer-
gency Boards, implicit encouragement is given to railroad bargainers to
accept tlie recommended terms for settlement. As to the antipooling provi-
11 See, "Railroad Strike Insurance Plan explained by Buyers at A.M.A. Meet," National
Urxderwriter, November 13, 1959, p. 1.
12 Press Release No. 49 of the Railway Labor Executives Association, July 27, 1959; see
also, John Barry, "Strike Insurance: A Threat to Collective Bargaining," American Federationist,
LCVIII (March, 1961). 17-20.
13 The reference to Sherman Act provisions is interesting because it represents a paradox
in the development of American labor law. For years unions sought exemption from the antitrust
laws of the nation on the basis of the fallacy of comparisons between the operation of the product
market and the factor market. Yet, in this case, the contention made by the BRT was that labor
is a commodity and that wages and working conditions represent the price of the commodity.
Since the strike insurance plan is a concerted activity involving employers who control a major
portion of the labor market, the participating employers are able to affect the price of the com-
modity in a manner in which they would not otherwise be able to do. Consequently, strike insur-
ance is a form of price fixing which is a per se violation of the restraint of^  trade provisions of
sec. 1 of the Sherman Act.
1* Besides the Long Island Rail Road, the suit also included as defendants the Association
of American Railroads and 22 other railroads.
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sions of the Interstate Commerce Act, the defense pointed out that the
relevant section was designed to prohibit a type of anticompetitive activity in
the product market of the industry which was "entirely foreign to the facts
of this case."^ ® Finally, concerning the Sherman Act, the railroads cited
Section 6 of the Clayton Act that "the labor of a human being is not a com-
modity or article of commerce."
The railroads claimed also that strike insurance is a legal economic weapon
specifically sanctioned by both the Clayton Act and tie Norris-LaCuardia
Act. The anti-injtmction clause of the former states that legal protection is
extended to "paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged
in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value." And
the Norris-LaGuardia Act grants injunctive immunity to nimierous activities
in the labor relations field, one of which is the "paying or giving to, or with-
holding from, any person participating in such labor dispute, any strike or
unemployment benefits or insurance, or other moneys or things of value."
The District Court dismissed the suit, in general adopting l ie railroads'
position.^ ^ The BRT appealed the decision. ITie Court of Appeals, however,
unanimously affirmed the decision of the lower cotut, holding the union
position to be "wholly without merit."" The Supreme Court denied review.^ *
Some Observations on the Program
While detailed information concerning the actual efiFect of
the program on labor relations is sparse, some observations are possible.
Since its adoption, strike insurance has been paid in the case of several
brief strikes against small railroads, but for only three strikes against large
lines. (The 25-day strike in 1960 against the Long Island Rail Road; a 12-
day strike in 1960 against the Pennsylvania Railroad; and a 30-day strike in
1962 against the Chicago and North Western Raikoad.) There is no indica-
tion that the occurrence or the coin-se of these disputes were altered by
the availability of strike insurance. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
strike insurance has increased strike incidence in the industry or contributed
to any noticeable lengthening of strike din-ation. The strike pattern of the
unions has Ukevidse remained basically unaltered. Thus, the impact to date
of this mutual assistance agreement on collective bargaining would appear
to be minimal.
The Service Interruption Policy represents a relatively new addition to
the arsenal of private economic weaponry used in collective bargaining.
IS Brief for Defendant, pp. 97-98.
18 W. P. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 211 F. Supp. 480, 487-490 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
" W. P. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F. 2d 366 (2d Cir. 1963)
18 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
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With its adoption, the railroad industry became the third major industry to
employ such a tactic. Programs that are operationally different but concep-
tually similar have existed in the newspaper publishing business since the
late forties and in the airline industry since 1958. While mutual strike assist-
ance has been studied by other groups, it has not been widely adopted.^*
Superficially, it would seem that die introduction of these programs could
be explained in terms of countervailing power. Most of the unions in the
three industries provide substantial strike benefits during shutdovms. Fimds
are collected nationally and made available locally for specific disputes.
But had the advent of these devices been only a response to the existence of
union programs, similar agreements would have presumably sprung up in
numerous other industries. Actually, it seems that their evolution has been
largely a reaction to a particular set of unstable bargaining characteristics,
which may not be duplicated elsewhere.
The most important disruptive factor present in aU three industries is
multiple unionism, with its enhanced strike potential. In the airline and raU-
road industries, there is the additional problem of rival unionism, which
dims the prospects for stable industrial relations even further.
Another characteristic of the three industries is that they are extremely
"time sensitive." Employers carmot stockpile inventories for their customers
prior to a strike, and opportunities to recover losses after a settlement are
limited. Aside from the fact that substitute services are available from other
industries during a strike, the firms wdthin the industry are typically oligopo-
listic in their regional or franchised markets. In the absence of a mutual
assistance device, the basically homogeneous nature of the service provided
and the lack of appreciable price differentials between firms means that
the customers of a struck firm can frequently switch to a nonstruck com-
petitor. When these considerations are combined with a perceptible rise
in fixed costs in recent years and a whipsaw strike pattern, it becomes clear
that these unique conditions foster mutual assistance programs, whereas
such is not the case in most industries.
With respect to public policy, there is httle conceptual difference between
the use of strike instorance payments by employer groups and strike benefits
by vmions.^ " Under existing legislation, however, the Landnmi-Criffin Act
10 It is known that the subject has been explored by officials in Hawaiian sugar, California
agriculture, trucking, commercial printing, steel, and the food chain business. Only the first two
have actually implemented programs. Both of these agreements are very modest and apparently
were desired because of the effect that a strike can have on the perishability of the products.
20 The Public Interest in National Labor Policy, report by the First Labor Study Group
(New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1961), pp. 135-136.
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requires that virtually all union financial activities-including strike benefit
programs—be subjected to federal scrutiny and public inspection. There is
no parallel statutory requirement imposed on employer strike assistance
programs. In the case of raihroads, the actual impact of the Service Inter-
ruption Policy in specific disputes could be more effectively evaluated if the
industry was directed by the ICC to submit ex post reports on the benefits
provided in each strike. In the airline industry, the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) has imposed such a requirement on the participants. The grounds
for similar action by the ICC are plentiful. Since many railroads have, until
recent years, claimed to be in financial doldrums, the liability that each
member raihroad assumes when it joins the program-upward to 20 times
its own daily indemnity-certainly imperils their solvency.
The courts have ruled that strike insurance in the railroad industry does
not violate any existing statute. A similar ruling has been made by the CAB
with respect to the airline program.^ ^ The newspaper publishers' agreement
has not been challenged and there is little chance that it will be. The rail-
road decisions, however, are somewhat unique in that the District Court
ruled that the Service Interruption Pohcy is specifically protected by existing
labor statutes. On this point, it seems to the writer that die lower court inter-
preted the word "insurance," as it appears in the Norris-LaCuardia Act, in
the broadest possible manner. In examining the actual operation of the plan,
it is impossible to find any element of commercial risk.^ ^ The insurer cannot
lose a single cent. All benefits are paid by assessing the nonstruck lines. The
insurer actually is paid solely to perform the administrative task of acting
as an intermediary transfer agent. While the terms Service Interruption
PoUcy and strike insurance are used interchangeably, it is questionable
whether they are actually synonymous. Nevertheless, the fact remains that
the courts have determined that the strike assistance plan does not violate
any existing laws.
The existence of a mutual strike assistance program is an outward sign of
an extremely insecure bargaining foundation. In the railroad industry, as
weU as in the airhne and newspaper publishing industries, the public interest
would be far better served if more attention were focused on the causes of
instability and strikes rather than on the symptoms of the trouble.
21 Opinion of the Board (July 10, 1964), CAB Docket No. 9977, Order E-21044. The
CAB, however, plans to review its decision in 1967 to see if the agreement has had any adverse
effects on collective bargaining in the industry.
22 See, "Railroad Strike Insurance Plan . . . ," p. 1, for a discussion which concurs with
my own conclusion.
